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A Path Already Travelled in Domestic Orders? From Fragmentation to Constitutionalisation 
in the Global Legal Order  
 
Introduction 
 
Courts are bellwethers of their legal orders. Their very establishment is indicative of legalisation, 
while their proliferation suggests that constituent and constituted power holders within a system 
accept adjudication as ‘as a viable and effective option for the resolution of disputes between them’.1 
One of the most striking features of the ‘new world order’ of the 1990s was the creation of new 
international and regional tribunals in response to dissatisfaction with an international system 
hitherto largely structured around the interests of the sovereign state.
2
 Courts with mandatory 
jurisdictions increasingly displaced ad hoc consensual forms of dispute settlement. Within 
constitutionalised governance orders, new courts would ordinarily be woven into a hierarchical 
structure. In new states constitutional drafters can draw upon multiple comparators in structuring 
such a hierarchy of courts. The latest generation of international and regional courts, however, have 
been created to address the immediate needs of particular policy areas or at the behest of particular 
actors, and not under the aegis of a coherent overarching model of global governance.  
 Other actors have largely left international tribunals to develop their relationships with each 
other, leading to competing accounts which attempt to place such interactions within the context of 
broader changes to the global legal order. In this article we focus upon the rival visions of 
constitutionalisation, which contends that the global legal order is deepening under the influence of 
nascent constitutional principles, and fragmentation, by which the global legal order’s increasing 
complexity is identified as a potential threat to its coherence. We challenge this dichotomy, 
reconceptualising fragmentation and constitutionalisation as processes which are intertwined within 
ongoing developments in global governance. Our analysis rests upon two propositions. First, the 
proliferation of international tribunals is currently one of the most important phenomena within the 
global legal order.
3
 In the last 50 years the ranks of international tribunals have swelled from a 
handful to over 100 active bodies.
4
 Second, although this multiplication of tribunals is often treated 
as having as deleterious impact upon the global legal order, the reality is that fragmentation is a 
                                                 
1
 T. Buergenthal, ‘Proliferation of International Courts and Tribunals: Is It Good or Bad?’ (2001) 14 Leiden JIL 267, 272. 
2
 See K.J. Alter, The New Terrain of International Law: Courts, Politics, Rights (PUP, 2014) 154-158. 
3
 See E. Benvenisti and G.W. Downs, ‘The Empire’s New Clothes: Political Economy and the Fragmentation of 
International Law’ (2007-2008) 60 Stanford LR 595, 596. 
4
 See W. Burke-White, ‘International Legal Pluralism’ (2004) 25 Michigan JIL 963, 965. The Project on International 
Courts and Tribunals provides a useful guide to these institutions, available at: http://www.pict-
pcti.org/publications/synoptic_chart/synop_c4.pdf. Accessed 1 Sep 2016. 
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common and formative experience within developing governance orders. We draw upon the Marxist-
Hegelian concept of ‘conflicting forces leading to transformation rather than impasse’,5 to argue that 
messy exchanges between tribunals can contribute to the development of constitutional attributes 
within a fragmented legal order. Initial interactions between international tribunals with overlapping 
jurisdictions will almost inevitably be fractious, but what Hegel characterised as a process of 
recognition can curtail these conflicts and enrich the global legal order.
6
 This article examines the 
extent to which such a process of recognition is underway between international tribunals and 
whether this process contributes not simply to a thicker body of global law, but to the 
constitutionalisation of the global legal order.  
 To shed new light on the expanding role of courts within the global legal order we draw 
comparisons with the development of courts within a constitutionalising domestic order. For this 
purpose the constitutional history, from the middle ages to the nineteenth century, of the polity which 
in 1707 became the United Kingdom (UK) provides a suitable frame of reference, being marked by 
‘multiple … courts with overlapping jurisdictions compet[ing] over many of the issues that now 
comprise the common law’.7 This history showcases courts’ efforts within a fragmented legal order 
to preserve their jurisdictions against encroachments by rival tribunals. In the absence of any formal 
programme of constitutionalisation these clashes demarked jurisdictions, developed working 
relationships between courts and even elucidated constitutional principles which would become 
fundamental to the UK’s governance order. In short, the activity of these competing courts had a 
constitutionalising effect. Today, a similar process of unstructured constitutionalisation is arguably 
being sustained through the interactions of international tribunals. Although the UK’s experience of 
gradual domestic constitutionalisation is not unique, its uncodified constitution has kept on display 
some of the markers of the historic constitutionalisation process, which are concealed in other 
domestic orders. The very fact that the UK’s Constitution and the burgeoning global constitutional 
order are both uncodified facilitates comparison between the historic process within the UK and 
current global developments.  
 We are not, in this article, advocating the transposition of any substantive UK governance 
arrangements to the global legal order. UK constitutional history instead provides us with an 
example of the operation over centuries of both fragmentation and constitutionalisation within a 
domestic legal order. This history acts as a proxy by which we can explain important features of 
judicial interaction within the fragmented and still early-stage process of global constitutionalisation. 
                                                 
5
 T. Sowell, ‘Marxian Value Reconsidered’ (1963) 30 Economica 297, 308. 
6
 See G.W.F. Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit (A.V. Miller, trans., OUP, 1977) 112. 
7
 E.P. Stringham and T.J. Zywicki, ‘Rivalry and Superior Dispatch: An Analysis of Competing Courts in Medieval and 
Early Modern England’ (2011) 147 Public Choice 497, 498. 
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The gradual integration of the UK’s court structures did not take place in a vacuum, with political, 
cultural and economic factors all contributing to a process which cannot be simplified as a linear 
movement from arbitrary justice administered by a ramshackle collection of tribunals to a cohesive 
system of courts imbued with the principle of the rule of law. But, as events like Brexit attest, the 
path of global constitutionalisation is neither direct nor certain to achieve a constitutionalised end. 
The backlash against the International Criminal Court in Africa, moreover, demonstrates that the 
proliferation of such courts does not necessarily and of itself enhance justice or fairness within the 
global order. In this article’s final section we apply the insights we have drawn from UK 
constitutional history in reflecting upon prominent clashes between international tribunals, including 
the disputed nature of the control test for state responsibility, the forum shopping within international 
environmental law and the opposition of the European Court of Justice (CJEU) to European Union 
(EU) accession to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). 
 
Theoretical and Methodological Considerations 
 
Before we proceed to our substantive account of the interaction between fragmentation and 
constitutionalisation we must explain its theoretical and methodological foundations. In this section 
we first outline the relevant elements of global constitutionalisation and fragmentation theories and 
develop our understanding of their inter-relationship before moving to the historical account of 
Courts in the UK. Thereafter we explain how we can draw defensible conclusions from an analysis 
which spans the international, regional and domestic levels of governance given the distinct nature of 
these levels of governance.  
 
(i) Constitutionalisation and Fragmentation  
 
No single conceptual framework captures the complexity of contemporary global governance.
8
 
Constitutionalisation and fragmentation theories, however, are often presented as conflicting 
accounts of the global legal order’s development. Constitutionalisation theorists argue that the global 
legal order is undergoing a shift from a horizontal and consent-based system to a structured order 
                                                 
8
 See D. Kennedy, ‘The Mystery of Global Governance’ (2008) 34 Ohio NULR 827, 844. Pluralist or global 
administrative law approaches are beyond the scope of our article; see N. Krisch and B. Kingsbury, ‘Introduction: Global 
Governance and Global Administrative Law in the International Legal Order’ (2006) 17 EJIL 1, A. Fischer-Lescano and 
G. Teubner, ‘The Two Faces of Janus: Rethinking Legal Pluralism’ (1991-1992) 13 Cardozo LR 1443. 
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embodying core constitutional norms.
9
 Whilst Neil Walker maintains that the term constitutional 
usually connotes ‘a mature rule-based or legal order’,10 this school of thought fractures when it 
comes to enunciating the features of constitutionalised global governance. There are as many 
different visions of a global constitution, and the explanations of the current degree of progress 
towards its achievement, as there are global constitutionalisation theorists. Constitutionalisation’s 
adherents differ in their accounts of a ‘post-Westphalia world’11 precisely because the global legal 
order’s structure and its underlying principles are still ‘emerging’.12 Fragmentation theory, by 
contrast, focuses upon the relationships between general international law and the ever expanding 
number of specialised areas under its superstructure. Whereas some areas, including international 
humanitarian law, are the product of long history others, including environmental law, are 
developing rapidly from more recent beginnings. Each new area of governance brings with it the 
potential for overlap and conflict with general international law and better-established sectoral 
jurisdictions. As a result the global order sags under the weight of ‘conflicting and multiplying 
jurisdictions, asserting the validity or persuasiveness of their rules, with no decider of last resort’.13 
The increasing number of international regimes and growing complexity of their inter-relationships 
is considered antagonistic to the development of overarching constitutional principles. 
We contend that the factionalism inspired by these accounts of global governance obscures the 
possibility of combining them into an overarching narrative that potentially directly contributes to 
substantive constitutionalism beyond the state. Even modest accounts of constitutionalisation have 
been criticised for attempting to wish a constitutional order into existence in the absence of ‘a 
definitive framework of implementation’.14 Such critiques, derived from fragmentation-based 
accounts, identify a constitutionalised global legal order as unrealised and misdiagnose it as being 
unrealisable without a codified instrument. We offer no such model for constitutionalisation. Instead, 
we demonstrate how the proliferation of international courts and the competition between them, even 
if varying in intensity within the global legal order, is contributing to a shift away from a legal order 
characterised by governmental consent. Our approach presupposes no features of the 
                                                 
9
 See B. Fassbender, ‘The United Nations Charter as Constitution of the International Community’ (1998) 36 Columbia 
JTL 529, 529 and J. Klabbers, ‘Setting the Scene’ in J. Klabbers, A. Peters and G. Ulfstein, The Constitutionalisation of 
International Law (OUP, 2009) 1, 10.  
10
 N. Walker, ‘Taking Constitutionalism beyond the State’ (2008) 56 Political Studies 519, 526.  
11
 N. Walker, ‘Post National Constitutionalism and the Problem of Translation’ in J.H. Weiler and M. Wind (eds.), 
European Constitutionalism beyond the State (CUP, 2003) 53. 
12
 E. de Wet, ‘The International Constitutional Order’ (2006) 55 ICLQ 51, 51.  
13
 Kennedy, ‘The Mystery of Global Governance’, above n.8, 848.  
14
 V.S. Mani, ‘Centrifugal and Centripetal Tendencies in the International System: Some Reflections’ in R. MacDonald 
and D. Johnston (eds.) Towards World Constitutionalism: Issues in the Legal Ordering of the World Community 
(Martinus Nijhoff, 2005) 241, 254. See also C. Sylvest, ‘Our passion for legality’ (2008) 34 Review of International 
Studies 403, 423. 
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constitutionalisation process beyond courts acting in an “autonomous” manner, meaning that their 
adjudication cannot be explained purely as the product of narrow agency granted by state actors.
15
 
Judicial constitutionalisation involves both the construction of rules for managing conflict between 
competing tribunals and the incremental development of principles including legal certainty, the rule 
of law and the global separation of powers. Such interactions between tribunals contributes to the 
emergence of constitutional principles within the global legal order even in the absence of a formal 
effort to create a “global constitution”. 16 
 
(i) The Global and the Domestic  
 
As for the divide between international and domestic governance orders, international law has been 
slow to impinge upon domestic constitutional thinking, especially in dualist countries. A.V. Dicey’s 
influential writings hitched the study of the UK constitution (‘all rules which .... affect the 
distribution or the exercise of the sovereign power in the state’17) to the domestic realm.18 He insisted 
that the UK Parliament’s legislative capacity could not be restricted by international law.19 Long into 
the twentieth century UK-based international lawyers were forced into anxious efforts to establish 
‘that international law really was a positive system of law’.20 The first efforts towards a 
constitutional dialogue between the domestic and international levels did not emerge within UK 
scholarship until after the First World War, when Frederick Pollock claimed that the League of 
Nations Covenant confounded ‘the insular doctrine lately rather prevalent’ by demonstrating that 
there ‘really is such a thing as international law’.21 H.L.A. Hart’s influential rejection of international 
                                                 
15
 Karen Alter characterizes this development as a ‘judicial revolution’; Alter, The New Terrain of International Law, 
above n.2, 127. 
16
 As we are concerned with the place of courts in early-stage constitutionalisation, and not with the nature of an 
emerging global legal order, we do not stake out a position on rival accounts of constitutionalism beyond the state, on 
which see J.L. Cohen, Globalization and Sovereignty: Rethinking Legality, Legitimacy, and Constitutionalism (CUP, 
2012) and M. Koskenniemi, ‘Constitutionalism as Mindset: Reflections on Kantian Themes about International Law and 
Globalization’ (2007) 8 Theoretical Inquiries in Law 9.  
17
 A.V. Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (8
th
 Ed., first published 1915, Liberty Fund, 1982) 
22. 
18
 See A.W.B. Simpson, Human Rights and the End of Empire: Britain and the Genesis of the European Convention 
(OUP, 2001) 35-37. 
19
 See S. Krasner, Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy (PUP, 1999) 11.  
20
 D.H.N. Johnson, ‘The English Tradition in International Law’ (1962) ICLQ 416, 432. See also B. Bowring, ‘What is 
Radical in “Radical International Law”?’ (2011) 22 FYBIL 3, 26-27. 
21
 F. Pollock, The League of Nations (Stevens and Sons, 1920) 90. When he later wrote the preface to this work, 
following the rejection of the Covenant by the United States’ Senate, Pollock found himself repeating Thomas Hobbes’ 
maxim that ‘[c]ovenants without the sword are but words, and of no strength to secure a man at all’; ibid., viii. See also 
N. Duxberry, Frederick Pollock and the English Juristic Tradition (OUP, 2004) 106-07. 
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law as a legal system further undermined these efforts.
22
 Only with the creation of international 
bodies, such as the EU, with powers to compel action by “sovereign” states, would Diceyan 
orthodoxy begin to erode.
23
 Requirements that rules be stable and certain likewise provide for much 
less of a distinction between domestic and international legal orders than was the case a century 
ago.
24
 Even then, Pollock appreciated that ‘[t]here is no system of law, codified or uncodified, in 
which one may not find many unsettled questions’.25 When few contemporary constitutional 
theorists seek a single sovereign source of authority within governance orders,
26
 instead evaluating 
whether the ‘organs participating in constitutional politics are brought under legal rules’,27 
international and domestic governance orders are increasingly susceptible to comparative analysis.  
As the global legal order became increasingly juridified and interconnected its complexity 
threatened the coherence attained by nineteenth-century international law, when fewer than 100 
states dealt directly with each other in an imperialist setting. In other words, the global legal order’s 
superstructure has expanded beyond the capacity of consent-based accounts of its foundations. Even 
so, many states tenaciously cling to external aspects of their sovereignty, generating an obstinacy 
towards global governance structures which becomes problematic as ever more powers are vested in 
a range of non-state actors, including courts and tribunals.
28
 If this upheaval has in some ways 
challenged ‘the constitutional coherence of national law’, as the International Law Commission 
(ILC) Report on Fragmentation asserts, this effect ‘has been counterbalanced by the contextual 
responsiveness and functionality of the emerging (moderate) pluralism’.29 Notwithstanding efforts at 
mitigation this friction fuels the global constitutionalisation and fragmentation debates.  
In the next sections we examine the UK’s constitutional history and employ it to generate 
lessons for fragmented global constitutionalisation. Although direct comparisons across different 
levels of governance have intermittently excited academic debate, they are often fraught with 
                                                 
22
 See H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law (2nd edn, OUP, 1994) 213–237. For criticism of Hart’s ‘carelessness’ with 
regard to international law, see J. Waldron, ‘Hart and the Principles of Legality’ in M.H. Kramer, C. Grant, B. Colburn 
and A. Hatzistavrou (eds), The Legacy of H.L.A. Hart (OUP, 2008) 67, 68. 
23
 The UK’s courts have, in the face of these challenges, sought to maintain as much of the orthodox approach as 
possible; see J.W.F. Allison, The English Historical Constitution: Continuity, Change and European Effects (CUP, 2007) 
126-127 and M. Gordon, ‘The Conceptual Foundations of Parliamentary Sovereignty’ [2009] PL 519, 519. 
24
 International law’s remit was already expanding when Hart rejected it as a legal system, leading to criticism of Hart’s 
‘carelessness’ in this regard; see Waldron, ‘Hart and the Principles of Legality’, above n.22, 68. 
25
 Pollock, The League of Nations, above n.21, 29. 
26
 Costas Douzinas notes how even Dicey relied upon multiple notions of sovereignty in his writings on UK 
constitutional law, separating “popular” and “legal” sovereignty; C. Douzinas, Human Rights and Empire: The Political 
Philosophy of Cosmopolitanism (Routledge-Cavendish, 2007) 282-283. 
27
 A. Arato, ‘Redeeming the Still Redeemable: Post Sovereign Constitution Making’ (2009) 22 International Journal of 
Politics, Culture, and Society 427, 428. 
28
 See A. O’Donoghue, ‘International Constitutionalism and the State’ (2013) 11 IJCL 1021. 
29
 ILC, ‘Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International 
Law’ (13 Apr 2006) A/CN.4/L.682, para.493. 
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difficulty.
30
 Today’s attempts to up-scale or transplant EU arrangements to global and other regional 
orders
31
 draw scorn similar to that heaped on efforts after Versailles to compare the creation of the 
League of Nations to the founding of the United States.
32
 As Andreas Paulus explains, global and 
domestic governance orders remain distinct because international law has to take into account a 
range of influences alien to domestic orders, including ‘the interstate level of classical international 
law and the individual level of world citizens’.33 UK-global comparisons remain fruitful, however, as 
both orders arguably seek to realise constitutional governance within partially-codified structures. 
The UK’s ‘constantly changing’34 constitutional order is therefore distinct from domestic 
constitutions which involve ‘a selection of legal rules, usually embodied in a single document’.35 
Whilst the “murkiness” inherent in the UK’s arrangements has provoked claims that the UK is not a 
‘true’ constitutionalised order,36 such approaches risk prioritising form over substance. Christian 
Tomuschat supplies a necessary countervailing impulse to Paulus when he warns that attaching the 
epithet “constitution” only to a fully-codified body of higher-order law risks neglecting alternative 
models of constitutionalised order.
37
  
David Kennedy identifies a further risk in domestic-global constitutional comparisons; people 
already ‘come to these debates carrying baggage from their national constitutional traditions’.38 This 
observation may seem particularly apposite when many commentators characterise the UK 
Constitution’s uncodified arrangements as uniquely ‘preservative’ in nature.39 And yet, even in the 
context of a departure as radical as South Africa’s post-apartheid Constitution, its Constitutional 
Court acknowledged that the new order ‘retains from the past’ some “acceptable” elements of the 
antecedent apartheid order.
40
 No uncodified system of governance, being the culmination of multiple 
                                                 
30
 For a useful account of the strictures upon comparative constitutional research, even between closely-related domestic 
orders, see M. Taggart, ‘The Tub of Public Law’ in D. Dyzenhaus (ed.), The Unity of Public Law (Hart, 2004) 455, 461-
462. 
31
 Kennedy, ‘The Mystery of Global Governance’, above n.8, 830. 
32
 G. Butler, ‘Sovereignty and the League of Nations’ (1920) 1 BYBIL 35, 39. 
33
 A.L. Paulus, ‘The International Legal System as a Constitution’ in J.L. Dunoff and J.P. Trachtman (eds.), Ruling the 
World: Constitutionalism, International Law, and Global Governance (CUP, 2009) 69, 72. 
34
 J.A.G. Griffith, ‘The Brave New World of Sir John Laws’ (2000) 63 MLR 159, 165.  
35
 F. Ridley, ‘The Importance of Constitutions’ (1966) 19 Parliamentary Affairs 312, 317. 
36
 D. Grimm, ‘The Achievement of Constitutionalism’ in P. Dobner and M. Loughlin (eds.), The Twilight of 
Constitutionalism (OUP, 2010) 11. 
37
 See C. Tomuschat, ‘Obligations Arising for States without or Against Their Will’ (1993) 241 Rec.des Cours 195, 217. 
38
 Kennedy, ‘The Mystery of Global Governance’, above n.8, 854. On the fetishism which can attend national 
constitutions, see M. Lerner, ‘Constitution and Court as Symbols’ (1937) 46 Yale LJ 1290, 1294. 
39
 C. Sunstein, Designing Democracy: What Constitutions Do (OUP, 2002) 67. The notion of an “ancient constitution”, 
adapting incrementally to changes in the needs of the polity, is today most closely associated with the writings of 
Edmund Burke; E. Burke, ‘Conciliation with America’ in P. Langford (ed.), Writings and Speeches of Edmund Burke 
(Clarendon Press, 1981) 193. See also J.C.D. Clark, Edmund Burke: Reflections on the Revolution in France: a Critical 
Edition (CUP, 2001) 181-3. 
40
 Shabballah v Attorney General (1996) SACC 725, [26]. See Arato, ‘Redeeming the Still Redeemable’, above n.27, 
441. 
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constitutionally significant events, with others still to come, can be crudely categorised as forward or 
backward looking.
41
 Our analysis nonetheless takes the precaution of eschewing direct comparisons 
between substantive constitutional arrangements, instead comparing the processes of 
constitutionalisation.
42
 Fragmentation is situated as an experience common to the development of 
both orders, with the different stages of their development enhancing the potential rewards for 
comparative analysis.  
The domestic and international spheres are not sealed from each other’s influence, much as 
individual domestic jurisdictions can experience transnational pulls.
43
 B.S. Chimni has gone so far as 
to suggest that the United Nations (UN) implicitly encourages ‘formal compliance with the norms of 
liberal democracy’, thereby maintaining and fostering the spread of the ‘neo-liberal state’.44 Whilst 
this remains something of an overstatement when formal requirements for UN membership have 
long given way to efforts to secure the Charter’s universal reach, from their inception new states 
experience compliance pull; they ‘must satisfy certain expectations to secure the recognition and 
acceptance of the international community, and these expectations are increasingly constitutional in 
nature’.45 The emergence of non-state actors within international law, the development of informal 
and formal points of governance beyond inter-state arrangements and the proliferation of law and 
courts at the global and regional levels have therefore combined to leave the sovereign state in flux. 
When the global and domestic orders are so intertwined, a working account of global 
constitutionalisation must attempt to reach across these levels of governance. In the following section 
we therefore take stock of the role played by fragmentation in the UK’s long constitutionalisation 
process. 
 
Fragmented Courts within the UK’s Constitutionalisation Process  
 
The constitutional history, from the mediaeval period onwards, of the UK and its forerunners 
illustrates how the remit of courts functions as a barometer of a governance order’s legalisation and 
                                                 
41
 See M. Loughlin, The Idea of Public Law (OUP, 2003) 4. 
42
 For an example of the idealisation of substantive aspects of the UK’s uncodified Constitution, see Martin Shapiro’s 
claims that UK arrangements have fostered a unique degree of judicial independence; M. Shapiro, Courts: A 
Comparative Political Analysis (UCP, 1981) viii. 
43
 Disputes persist over the benefit of these influences. Some authors see the scope for transnationalism in terms of inter-
elite engagement; A. Slaughter, A New World Order (PUP, 2004) 65-66. Global legal pluralism, by contrast, charts the 
emergence of extensively interconnected orders; A. Fischer-Lescano and G. Teubner, ‘Regime Collisions: The Vain 
Search for Legal Unity in the Fragmentation of Global Law’ (2004) 25 Michigan JIL 999, 1006. 
44
 B.S. Chimni, ‘International Institutions Today: An Imperial Global State in the Making’ (2004) 15 EJIL 11, 15.  
45
 D.S. Law and M. Versteeg, ‘The Evolution and Ideology of Global Constitutionalism’ (2011) 99 California LR 1163, 
1179. Articles 2.6, 102 and 103, and the UN Charter’s place as customary international law, ensures its relevance beyond 
its state-based membership. 
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even constitutionalisation. Though few contemporary theorists draw upon the UK constitutional 
order’s fragmented past,46 in 1918 it provided a parallel for the historian Albert Pollard in his 
advocacy of a League of Nations.
47
 He considered how the twelfth-century monarch Henry II, 
attempting to restore order to his kingdom after protracted turmoil, was hampered by the absence of 
institutions capable of addressing disputes which had hitherto been settled by violence. Undaunted, 
Henry ‘did not attempt to create a new constitution’, but rather introduced legal writs which 
prevented seizures of land by force and permitted claimants to argue their case before a new royal 
court.
48
 Pollard argued that with the success of these instruments of “royal justice” ‘the habit of 
argument slowly superseded the custom of fighting’.49 Although the English legal system did not 
begin in an ordered form, based upon ‘definite courts with reams of rules and regulations’,50 Pollard 
insisted that legalisation gradually took hold. From these beginnings Pollard portrayed England as 
rapidly progressing towards a fully constitutionalised order.
51
  
Contemporary international lawyers believed that Pollard’s ‘parallel with the League of 
Nations ... is extremely close’,52 for whilst the League was far from a global constitutional order it 
nonetheless featured ground-breaking mechanisms for securing the adjudicated settlement of 
international disputes. Pollard’s Whiggish prolepsis, however, hurries over the intense power 
struggles between actors and institutions which followed, obscuring the significance of 
fragmentation within the history of the English legal system.
53
 Royal tribunals jostled for authority 
with feudal, manorial, urban and ecclesiastical courts, usurping these rival jurisdictions ‘gradually 
but relentlessly’54 over the following centuries.55 Clashes between the secular and ecclesiastical 
courts
56
 descended into particularly protracted struggles for supremacy: ‘The secular courts would 
protect their jurisdiction by writs of prohibition, which, however, were difficult to apply and even 
                                                 
46
 Martin Loughlin notes how, for much of the last 250 years, ‘the British state has managed to present its governing 
arrangements as being so secure as to avoid the need for juristic investigation into its foundations’. M. Loughlin, The 
Foundations of Public Law (OUP, 2010) 3. 
47
 Pollard was a member of the UK Foreign Office’s Phillimore Committee, which in 1918 drew up an influential 
blueprint for the League of Nations and Permanent Court of International Justice. See D.H. Miller, Drafting of the 
Covenant (G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1928) 3. 
48
 A.F. Pollard, The League of Nations: An Historical Argument (OUP, 1918) 53. For a detailed account of writs de pace 
habenda and writs praecipe, see F.W. Maitland, The Constitutional History of England (CUP, 1919) 112. 
49
 ibid., 54. 
50
 ibid., 56. 
51
 ibid., 56.  
52
 Butler, ‘Sovereignty and the League of Nations’, above n.32, 41. 
53
 Michel Foucault, drawing on Friedrich Nietzsche, describes processes such as fragmentation as the ‘obscure power 
relations’ from which ideas, in this case constitutional principles, flowed; M. Foucault, Power: Essential Works of 
Foucault 1954-1984 (Penguin, 1994) vol.III, 7.  
54
 G.B. Flahiff, ‘The Writ of Prohibition to Court Christian in the Thirteenth Century’ (1944) 6 Mediaeval Studies 261, 
261. 
55
 See A.R. Hogue, Origins of the Common Law (Liberty Press, 1966) 5. 
56
 See Maitland, The Constitutional History of England, above n.48, 10-11. 
10 
 
more difficult to enforce. The ecclesiastical courts, if sufficiently provoked, could excommunicate 
royal judges’.57 Whilst the Royal Courts would ultimately gain ‘superintendency’58 over their rivals, 
this fragmented epoch was vital to the governance order’s development; a realisation easily missed if 
we skip to the current arrangements and neglect ‘the legal institutions which didn’t make the grade 
into today’s structure’.59 Modern conceptions of “sovereignty” cannot be grafted onto this extended 
fragmented era to exclude comparison to the global legal order.
60
 
Soon after the creation of Henry II’s writs even the Royal Courts fragmented into specialised 
jurisdictions.
61
 The King’s Bench ‘had a general superintendence over criminal justice’, could 
exercise oversight of the actions of crown officeholders and ‘could entertain any civil action in 
which the defendant was charged with a breach of the king’s peace’.62 The Court of Common Pleas 
dealt with ‘all cases between subject and subject’.63 The Court of Exchequer, from ‘ambiguous’ 
beginnings relating to royal revenue, came to administer cases relating debt.
64
 The relationship 
between these courts was not static, with Frederic Maitland explaining how professional interests 
drove a centuries-long struggle for predominance: ‘[Much] of our legal history is to be explained by 
the fact that for centuries the judges were paid by fees; more business therefore meant more money, 
and they had a keen interest in attracting cases to their courts’.65 These courts vied amongst 
themselves and with later tribunals including the Court of Chancery (administering equity as 
opposed to common law) and, more infamously, the Star Chamber. Whilst the Court of Common 
Pleas saw its jurisdiction undercut by its rivals,
66
 Chancery would prove much more adept at 
resisting attempts by the King’s Bench to establish its dominance.67 Equity’s ‘procedural advantages’ 
were such that common law judges came to fear that Chancery would usurp their institutions.
68
 In 
1616, James I had to personally intervene in this power struggle, maintaining the Chancery’s ability 
to prevent the enforcement of a King’s Bench judgment obtained by inequitable means.69 This 
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intervention prevented equity from being subsumed into the remit of the King’s Bench, maintaining 
divisions between the common law and equity which would persist until the 1870s. Long after the 
UK governance order’s constitutionalisation the legal system of England and Wales remained a 
tapestry of overlapping and fragmented jurisdictions.  
Although infighting amongst courts would appear to be endemic as a hierarchical order 
emerges, these centuries of fragmentation would subsequently be all but forgotten. Modern judges 
ordinarily dress up the historic infighting as evidence that ‘[t]he common law courts have always 
been vigilant and jealous of any attempt to usurp or encroach on their jurisdiction’.70 But 
fragmentation had real benefits for the maturing constitutional order. At times of major upheaval the 
existence of rival tribunals as some of the order’s most prominent ‘constituted bodies’71 helped to 
maintain a degree of constitutional continuity. For example, the Crown’s use of the Star Chamber as 
to expedite its legal business became a source of controversy in the early-seventeenth century. 
Discontent with this tribunal hardened opposition to Charles I in the prelude to the Civil Wars of the 
1640s.
72
 So intense was this opprobrium that to this day commentators ‘never tire of affixing the 
appellation “Star Chamber” to any procedure or institution which rightly or wrongly appears to deny 
justice or to vitiate due process’.73 Within a still-fragmented system, however, it could be abolished 
without unbalancing the constitutional order.
74
 Existing tribunals developed their jurisdictions to 
compensate for its demise, and despite pressure for radical reform of the judiciary ‘the Westminster 
courts were in general little disrupted’ by the fighting.75 For the English legal system the Civil Wars 
did not, therefore, amount to a ‘hurricane … [sweeping] away all institutions of the ancien régime’.76  
The fragmented era also contributed to constitutional principles. Perhaps the most famous 
example of fragmentation giving rise to fundamental principle is found in the royal avowal in Magna 
Carta’s Clause 40 that ‘[t]o no one will we sell, to no one will we refuse or delay, right or justice’.77 
This provision is often regarded as the root of today’s right to a fair hearing, with popular accounts 
explaining the development of the UK’s constitutional order as a process by which ‘[l]aws which had 
been made to defend barons … [were] extended as like rights to everyone else’.78 The barons’ 
immediate concern, however, had not been to precipitate a “constitutional moment”, but to protect 
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their own interests in a fragmented legal order which had seen royal writs ‘freely sold to litigants’,79 
and more specifically to parties who had been unsuccessful in actions before the barons’ manorial 
courts. Clause 40’s immediate purpose is better understood if read alongside Clause 34; ‘The writ 
called praecipe shall not be issued for the future, so as to deprive a free man of his court’. In these 
provisions, the barons were attempting to protect the operation of their manorial courts and the 
revenues thereby gained. Maitland notes that this goal was in part achieved, for ‘in cases of land’ this 
development ‘puts a check on the acquisitiveness of the royal court’.80 But in the longer run 
displacing this writ did not prevent the royal tribunals from gaining the upper hand over manorial 
courts.
81
 Later constitutionally significant decisions often involved clashes over the preliminary issue 
of which Royal Court had jurisdiction to hear the claim. In Bushel’s Case,82 a landmark decision on 
the role of juries, Vaughan CJ complained that ‘this Court is for Common Pleas, between subject and 
subject, but in a criminal case the plea is between the King and his prisoner’.83 His fellow judges 
were less concerned with the jurisdictional issue than with the substance of the claim and ultimately 
established ‘that no judge can fine or imprison a jury for any verdict they may give, no matter how 
wrong the judge may think it to be’.84 Adam Smith recognised the importance of these institutional 
rivalries for the development of due process; ‘each court endeavoured, by superior dispatch and 
impartiality, to draw to itself as many causes as it could’.85 
One potential side-effect of a fragmented order is that some important issues can be left 
unsettled, stuck in a constitutional “no-man’s-land” between competing jurisdictions. As early as the 
reign of Richard II, efforts were made to separate military law, administered by the Court of the 
Constable and the Marshal, from the jurisdictions of the existing Royal Courts.
86
 Once a separate 
system for maintaining military discipline developed considerable doubt surrounded whether the 
power persisted to subject civilians to military jurisdiction even in time of revolt or invasion. This 
uncertainty resulted from both long periods in which martial law was not required and the 
development on a case-by-case basis of the rule of law as a constitutional principle. The Wolfe Tone 
case
87
 arose following the capture of a leader of the failed United Irishmen rebellion in 1798. When 
Tone was sentenced to death by court-martial his father sought a writ of habeas corpus for his 
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release before the Irish King’s Bench. To enable it to consider the power of a military court to try a 
civilian whilst the ordinary courts remained open, the King’s Bench ordered the military authorities 
to stay Tone’s execution. Although Tone died of self-inflicted wounds before the military could deal 
with this intervention, a century later the episode led Maitland to conclude that if, during a rebellion, 
‘one of the rebels captured, there is no court that can try him save the ordinary criminal courts of the 
country’.88 Only Parliament could ‘override’ this constitutional principle,89 as it would come to do in 
response to twentieth-century crises. Parliament’s mandate of alternative legal arrangements in 
emergency situations, however, did not always settle these jurisdictional disputes. The struggle 
between military and civilian courts was reignited when, in Egan v Macready,
90
 a military tribunal 
sentenced a civilian to death during the Irish War of Independence. When O’Connor MR, a civilian 
judge, accepted a challenge against this ruling on the basis that the military authorities could not 
‘sweep away the limitations as to punishment’,91 the military commander threatened to imprison 
anyone, including the judge, who interfered with his activities.
92
 The development of legal 
constraints upon the executive within the UK’s constitutional order, and the degree to which the rule 
of law remains a contested concept, can therefore be traced in part to historic fragmentation. 
Tying together the legal order’s fragmented offshoots took hundreds of years. Whereas a 
multiplicity of tribunals had once advanced constitutionalisation, by the nineteenth century Lord 
Brougham considered that these competing jurisdictions no longer served a useful purpose: 
 
The first state of the Courts being that of distinct jurisdiction, then of course this separation of 
provinces was praised; afterwards, all distinction became obsolete, and then the conflict and 
competition were as much commended: and with far greater reason, if the competition were 
real; but it is almost purely speculative.
93
 
 
For Brougham ‘real’ competition on issues of legal principle had given way to petty squabbles over 
jurisdiction. The disadvantages of fragmentation within the legal system had come to outweigh its 
benefits. Nonetheless, a further half century would elapse before the Judicature Acts integrated the 
fragmented court structures into a unified structure. These reforms exemplify the difficulties 
                                                 
88
 Maitland, The Constitutional History of England, above n.48, 492. 
89
 J. Jowell, ‘Of Vires and Vacuums: The Constitutional Context of Judicial Review’ [1999] PL 448, 458-9. 
90
 Egan v Macready and others [1921] 1 IR 265. 
91
 ibid., 275. 
92
 N. Macready, Annals of an Active Life (Doran,1925) 516. For an overview of the affair, see K.D. Ewing and C.A. 
Gearty, The Struggle for Civil Liberties: Political Freedom and the Rule of Law in Britain, 1914-1945 (OUP, 2000) 365-
367. 
93
 Brougham, Speeches of Henry Lord Brougham, above. n.66, 327. 
14 
 
associated with merger processes. They were not the result of one paradigm-altering reform moment, 
but of the gradual appreciation of the problems resultant from fragmentation. As such, they 
encountered considerable resistance from legal professionals with vested interests in the existing 
system.
94
 One risk for such structural reforms within a legal order is the possibility of loose ends. 
Even after the Judicature Acts practical distinctions remained between equity and the common law.
95
 
Some near-moribund courts were left out of the merger settlement altogether. After over a century of 
disuse, the High Court of Chivalry (once tasked with dealing with martial law’s application amongst 
myriad other causes of action), had to determine whether its jurisdiction still existed when its 
services were unexpectedly called upon.
96
 Lord Goddard, noting that the Court ‘fell into disuse was 
because how its decisions are to be enforced is a matter of great doubt and obscurity’, nonetheless 
accepted that ‘whatever interval may have elapsed since its last sitting, there is no way so far as I 
know of putting an end to it save by an Act of Parliament’.97 Extended processes of juridification do 
not, therefore, exhibit linear progression toward an inevitable conclusion. In the absence of an 
overarching constitutionalisation programme, vested interests and the need to accommodate both 
prominent and neglected institutions pose unique challenges. And although these issues might be 
particularly acute in a centuries-old order, a global constitutionalisation process will ultimately have 
to address them and in the next section we turn to the debate on the fragmentation of the global legal 
order to consider whether echoes of UK constitutional history may be found. 
 
The Fragmented Global Legal Order  
 
Fragmentation indicates that a legal order has matured beyond the point at which it is defined by 
consent-based obligations. If the UK’s constitutional order is the product of a gradual and 
fragmented constitutionalisation process, during which multiple courts superintended overlapping 
areas of the law without a clear hierarchy or fixed jurisdictional boundaries, within modern domestic 
orders fragmentation has largely been relegated to constitutional history. Fragmentation is 
nonetheless inevitable when a legal system develops in a non-ordered fashion and can generate a 
trajectory towards normative constitutionalisation. It remains a live issue within the emerging 
differentiated global legal order.
98
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In the constitutional ferment of 1918 influential figures campaigned for a League of Nations 
which would with one stroke constitute an international constitutional order. The pamphlets of 
Frederick Pollock stand out for their combination of idealism and pragmatism. Pollock prized the 
impetus a unified and mandatory court system would bring to a nascent global legal order, arguing 
for a League Covenant ‘whose binding force must depend on the renouncement by every party to it, 
in some measure, of independent sovereign power, and in particular of the right to be judge in one’s 
own cause’.99 Pollock’s grand vision for the rule of law underpinning global governance came 
unstuck when many states
100
 refused to grant the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) 
compulsory jurisdiction.
101
 Undeterred, he had staked out a fall-back narrative that whilst the global 
governance order would not imminently be able ‘to issue direct executive commands ... such power 
will come later if it is not granted at first’.102 Although the League did not provide a substantively 
constitutionalised order, these beginnings did, as Albert Pollard predicted, ‘foster international 
politics’, by which he meant encouraging further constitutionalisation.103 
Giving the example of the Postal Union
104
 and its imposition of particular rates for foreign 
post, Pollock noted that authority over aspects of governance had already shifted, notwithstanding 
the absence of any overarching global constitutional order.
105
 The possibility of incremental 
international constitutionalisation might have been instinctively appealing to both Pollock and 
Pollard as scholars of UK constitutional history, but others began to identify the operation of tandem 
fragmenting and constitutionalising pressures. Even as the Second World War raged Manley 
Hudson, a PCIJ judge, noted a groundswell of opinion that a ‘general international tribunal may not 
be adequate for local needs’.106 Soon after the war ended efforts began to augment the UN 
framework with treaties covering, inter alia, human rights (European/American Convention on 
Human Rights/African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights), trade (WTO/NAFTA/ASEAN), the 
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sea (UNCLOS) and foreign investment. In parts of the world deeper regional governance orders were 
instituted (EU/AU/Eurasian Economic Union). Many of these orders feature judicalised dispute 
settlement and interpretation mechanisms. Even in the context of bilateral investment treaties, where 
no overarching “order” is immediately evident, the jurisdiction of the World Bank’s International 
Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) is regularly stipulated.
107
 Thus global 
legalisation serviced by a range of institutions, and with it the beginnings of constitutionalisation, 
came to cover interactions in numerous substantive policy areas. Pollock’s ‘coming rule of law’108 
may have been delayed, but this does not necessarily mean it has been averted. 
Rather than awaiting some “constitutional moment” we must evaluate what this fragmentation 
tells us about the state of constitutionalisation within global governance order and whether 
constitutional concepts can survive and take root without a global constitutional culture capable of 
perpetuating its foundation story to the point when it gains widespread acceptance. As is evident 
from the UK’s history, claims of horizontal equality amongst multifarious courts may in the short-
term have a deleterious effect on the rule of law and impose significant transaction costs. The 
disadvantages of such unsystematic developments for the global order, however, should not be 
overplayed; ‘The benefits of the alternative, multiple forums, are worth the possible adverse 
consequences that may contribute to less coherence’.109 The UK’s history also illustrates how 
tribunals enliven a still-maturing order, giving substance to core principles like the rule of law in 
particular fields even when, in others, they are in danger of being honoured in the breach. Much like 
the High Court of Chivalry the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) 
had to assess the legality of its jurisdiction in the Tadić case.110 In determining that the UN Security 
Council had acted in accordance with the UN Charter, the ICTY was really asserting that its creation 
complied with a global rule of law, highlighting the contribution which specialist tribunal scan make 
to the global order. In recent years many specialised tribunals, including the World Trade 
Organisation’s Dispute Settlement Body (WTODSB), the International Tribunal for the Law of the 
Sea (ITLOS) and the CJEU have all developed the operation of general international environmental 
law despite their decisions being primarily intended to address the priorities of their own legal 
orders.
111
 The absence of a hierarchal court structure generates space for experimentation by 
tribunals, even if the consequent legal developments are not always neat.  
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If some ‘freewheeling’ jurisprudence enhanced the prominence of courts within the UK’s 
constitutionalisation process, judicial caution has lessened the influence of judicial decisions in what 
Ronald Dworkin described as a ‘comparable formative period’ for international law.112 The 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) has not always undertaken the responsibilities which adhere to its 
billing as the World Court. In particular, no court which flaunts its position as ‘the only judicial body 
vested with universal and general jurisdiction’113 should abjure, as the ICJ long did, from citing the 
judgments of other tribunals.
114
 Bruno Simma, whilst an ICJ judge, suggested that his fellow judges 
would avoid the risk of clashes with other tribunals even to the detriment of their reasoning: 
 
[I]f there are international institutions that are constantly and painstakingly aware of the 
necessity to preserve the coherence of international law, it is the international courts and 
tribunals. Such caution might sometimes come at the price of dodging issues that would very 
much have deserved to be tackled …115  
 
Whilst this practice was not distinct from that of many other international tribunals,
116
 and is in 
decline,
117
 such an important court holding itself aloof for so long dampened fragmentation’s 
potential to foster fundamental principles.  
 The ICJ’s volte face over citing other tribunals can be linked to its concerns over the impact of 
the lex specialis doctrine, which has long operated to maintain doctrinal coherence in international 
law when multiple horizontal areas of law apply to the same dispute.
118
 Employed both as an 
interpretative tool and a substantive rule, lex specialis enables a more specific legal framework to 
trump its more general counterpart,
119
 thereby permitting specialist tribunals to remodel general rules 
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within their remit.
120
 When a small number of specialist tribunals existed and direct state consent was 
necessary for them to exercise jurisdiction, lex specialis smoothed over potential conflicts between 
specialist and general courts. The doctrine did not, however, mitigate conflicts which arose between 
tribunals which both claimed specialist authority
121
 and, as the range of international tribunals 
expanded, so too did the risk that ‘the same rule of law might be given different interpretations in 
different cases’.122 ICJ President Gilbert Guillaume concluded that reliance upon the doctrine might 
accelerate fragmentation and that ‘[f]or the purpose of maintaining the unity of the law, the various 
existing courts ... could ... be empowered in certain cases … to request advisory opinions from the 
International Court of Justice’.123 In other words he was advocating an enhanced role for the ICJ as 
an apex court to respond to the needs of a no-longer horizontal system in which inter-tribunal 
relations were becoming increasingly important.
124
 
Eyal Benvenisti and George Downs suggest three difficulties with the multiplicity of courts at 
the global level beyond doctrinal incoherence; first, weaker states are less able to engage in the 
resultant procedural cross-fighting; second, such circumstances enable stronger states to dictate their 
venue of choice while circumscribing the forum’s authority; and third, a fragmentation obscures 
intentionality, thereby enabling more powerful states to evade responsibility for the deficiencies in 
the global legal order that they played a prominent role in establishing.
125
 Their critique suggests that 
the current proliferation of tribunals and the attendant fragmentation could be but a fleeting moment 
of false grandeur within a global governance order which remains dominated by a few powerful state 
actors. We do not dispute that the short-term impact of fragmentation often appears capricious and 
that the adverse impacts have often been disproportionately experienced by the Global South.
126
 
Judicial institutions can rise or fall into virtual desuetude for seemingly trivial reasons, such as 
institutional novelty. The waning importance and use of the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) 
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following the PCIJ’s creation demonstrated a temporary preference for judicial over arbitrarial 
decision-making.
127
 Perceptions over performance also matter. 
128
 Disillusionment with the ICJ 
amongst post-colonial states followed the South West Africa Case,
129
 which pitted self-determination 
arguments against the remnants of colonialism and the Mandate-territory system. The Court’s 
rejection of Ethiopia and Liberia’s challenge to South Africa’s colonisation of its neighbour on an 
issue of standing was perceived to favour colonial powers, thereby illustrating the impact of 
intentionality upon a tribunal’s operation. This inherent instability in the disorganised global system, 
however, gives rise to multiple decision points at which ruptures in the European origins of 
international law could occur. The key factor at such junctures is whether the international tribunal is 
sufficiently secure to resist any subsequent backlash by developed countries. The WTO’s dispute 
settlement mechanisms, for example, have recently seen a decline in the number of disputes raised 
before them.
130
 Whilst this drop may in part be a by-product of the difficulties which have plagued 
WTO negotiations, it could also be mark a reaction by developed countries against WTO 
jurisprudence which they perceive as unfavourable. Disputes such as EC – Bananas III, for example, 
saw the WTO Appellate Body accept that member states can issue a claim in relation to either the 
direct or indirect economic effects of a policy,
 131
 substantially broadening the scope for developing 
countries to mount challenges. The ongoing negotiations over the Transatlantic Trade and 
Investment Partnership, with its facility for distinct adjudication panels, could therefore amount to 
efforts to sideline the WTO and its institutions by regionalising the multilateral trade system.
132
 Even 
if ruptures like this are ultimately sealed, they indicate that fragmentation cannot be simplistically 
characterised as a reactionary force within international law.  
 
The Path of Fragmented Global Constitutionalisation Perceived  
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(i) Four Facets of Fragmented Constitutionalisation  
 
The fragmented historical relationships between judicial institutions within the UK’s legal systems 
allow us to perceive, if through a mirror, and darkly, some of the likely features of fragmented global 
constitutionalisation. First, international courts, within and sometimes beyond the limitations of their 
formal jurisdiction, will strive to preserve their competences. This does not necessarily mean 
tribunals will be locked in a perpetual state of struggle. A tribunal’s awareness of the complexity of 
the global order can also mitigate tensions with other institutions and contribute to a 
constitutionalisation process. In Hassan
133
 the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) was 
obliged to consider the interaction between its own human rights jurisdiction and rules of 
international humanitarian law developed by the ICJ. Following a careful review of relevant ICJ 
decisions,
134
 the ECtHR drew upon the ICJ’s acknowledgment that international human rights law 
and international humanitarian law may apply concurrently
135
 to develop its jurisprudence on the 
geographical reach of the ECHR regime; ‘the Convention cannot be interpreted in a vacuum and 
should so far as possible be interpreted in harmony with other rules of international law of which it 
forms part’.136 Many other international tribunals, including the WTODSB,137 explicitly subject their 
specialised jurisdictions to the broader framework of international law as a means of bolstering their 
legitimacy.  
In other circumstances, such as the ICTY’s departure from ICJ jurisprudence138 on the control 
test for state responsibility in Tadić,139 a clash with the ICJ enabled the specialist tribunal to assert its 
independent capacity to develop concepts within international law of particular relevance to its remit. 
The premium which the ICJ has historically placed upon inter-institutional comity did not prevent it 
from subsequently reasserting its original test.
140
 Seen through the prism of the institutional rivalries 
prevalent during the UK’s constitutional development such struggles and accommodations are 
inevitable occurrences as the unstructured global legal order matures. The variety of actors (states, 
individuals, corporations, NGOs and diasporas) claiming different sets of rights and obligations 
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within this fragmented order contributes to the need for international tribunals to rely on claims 
deriving from either hierarchy or specialisation to support their interpretations of international law. 
The ultimate success of one competing test over the other, however, is unlikely to be immediately 
apparent. The rival effective and overall control tests for state responsibility both stand until one of 
the protagonist tribunals backs down or until other tribunals lend decisive support to one test over the 
other. One of the tests will likely gain acceptance,
141
 with this outcome determining not only when a 
state may be held responsible for the actions of non-state actor
142
 but also when a non-state actor can 
be held liable under international criminal law.
143
  
Such disputes are not mere theatre, in this instance the distinction determines the direction of 
international criminal law and has provoked considerable critical evaluation of the rival tests.
144
 UK 
constitutional history’s second lesson for the global order is therefore that jurisdictional struggles 
between institutions have the potential to elucidate fundamental constitutional principles 
underpinning the order. In the era before intense fragmentation the ICJ’s eagerness to recognise erga 
omnes norms, and its reticence towards jus cogens norms,
145
 generated considerable debate over the 
substantive content of these respective norms, which have both been characterised as central to the 
global constitutionalisation process.
146
 Jus cogens norms have been characterised as ‘the first 
stepping-stones towards an eventual build-up of international constitutionalism’,147 meaning that 
their prolonged marginalisation in ICJ jurisprudence risks undermining constitutionalisation.
148
 
Fragmentation, however, is challenging the hitherto horizontal nature of international law. The 
success of specialist human rights tribunals, and their jurisprudence touching upon ‘the overriding 
importance’ of jus cogens,149 has contributed to pushing the ICJ towards referencing, if not yet 
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relying upon, these norms.
150
 Multi-forum litigation, which might appear particularly threatening to 
international law’s coherence, can accelerate this development of fundamental principles. The 
engagement of multiple tribunals in the MOX Plant case,
151
 for example, increased concerns that 
jurisdictional uncertainty in environmental law was becoming pervasive, but the institutions involved 
were ultimately able to resolve the jurisdictional dilemmas facing them.
152
 The litigation not only 
clarified the relationship between the tribunals involved but saw the tentative development of the 
precautionary principle as a key feature of international environmental law.
153
 Even when multiple 
decisions produce outcomes which seem difficult to reconcile, in the short run potentially affecting 
stakeholder confidence in tribunals and certainty of jurisdiction, such diverging jurisprudence might 
ultimately enhance understanding of the substantive legal issues in question. Of course, the benefits 
of multiple actions in terms of substantive developments in international tribunals’ jurisprudence will 
not always outweigh the costs.  
The third illustrative lesson the UK provides for global fragmentation is that, within 
fragmented orders, levels of use are critical to a jurisdiction’s development. Swathes of public 
international law have not been subject to a specialist jurisdiction and are therefore rarely litigated. 
These fallow areas can in part be attributed to the global legal order’s historical simplicity; until the 
PCA’s creation in 1899, inter-state negotiation and good offices held sway (but they also 
demonstrate, to paraphrase Louis Henkin, that the majority of international law functions most of the 
time
154
). Novel litigation can lead to the development of previously dormant aspects of tribunal’s 
jurisdiction and may require the tribunal to re-align itself and its jurisprudence. The wrangling 
between Libya and the ICC over the trial of Saif Gaddafi indicates how jurisdictional claims can be 
resolved by the courts themselves, in this instance by developing the doctrine of complementarily in 
international criminal law.
155
 Courts are always rising and falling within fragmented legal orders, as 
litigants test the range of available forums in their search for a desired outcome. Disputes often 
assume a multi-institutional character when a legal issue is novel and the positions of international 
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tribunals are consequently fluid.
156
 The Australian Tobacco Plain Packaging dispute spilled from the 
Australian High Court into the WTODSB and ICSID.
157
 Mikhail Khodorkovsky’s arrest and criminal 
trial in Russia has resulted in cases before the ECtHR, the PCA and the Arbitration Institute of the 
Stockholm Chamber of Commerce.
158
 The Chevron and Ecuador dispute regarding responsibility for 
environmental pollution has now been heard before domestic courts in the US and Ecuador, the PCA 
and the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights.
159
  
In many instances of multi-forum litigation each claim forms part of an overall dispute, but 
different international tribunals might well be dealing with different aspects of that dispute 
dependent on their remit and standing arrangements. The Chagos islands litigation, for example, 
concerns the UK’s administration of the British Indian Ocean Territory for defence purposes. One 
case reached the ECtHR based upon the expulsion and continued exclusion of the islands 
inhabitants,
160
 another reached the PCA as a result of Mauritius’ opposition to the UK’s declaration 
of a Marine Protected Area.
161
 Although the UK won the former case and lost the latter, the subject 
matter of the claims was sufficiently distinct to allow the two tribunals sufficient freedom of action 
to reach their own decisions without conflict. The lack of scope for international tribunals to alter 
their remit, procedure or standing requirements to make themselves more attractive to claimants 
helps to prevent aggressive efforts by particular tribunals to attract litigation.
162
 Powerful institutions 
can, however, take steps to secure their position against rivals. In Commission v Ireland, part of the 
MOX Plant litigation, the CJEU attempted to prevent EU member states from using alternative 
international tribunals when a dispute touched upon EU law by emphasising that the states owed a 
‘duty of loyalty to the judicial system created by the Community Treaties’.163 For now, the CJEU 
maintains this position through the unique depth of the EU’s legal order. It remains to be seen 
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whether such claims can be sustained in the aftermath of Brexit, an event which could encourage 
some of the remaining EU member states to become more assertive of their ability to choose 
alternate fora for disputes and which could also embolden rival tribunals to make rulings at variance 
with the CJEU if they hear such cases.
164
 The possible scope for renewed conflict between tribunals 
after Brexit once again illustrates that the development of a global legal order does not involve a 
linear progression from fragmentation to constitutionalisation but the intertwining of these concepts. 
If multi-forum litigation becomes ubiquitous positive steps may ultimately be required to structure 
tribunal relationships in place of the current ad hoc judicial adjustments, but any such agreements 
will be more likely to be effective if they reflect the understandings which courts have already 
developed regarding their respective purviews. 
Fourth, in the absence of a centralised political process, the relationships between courts will 
develop over time and on a case-by-case basis. Whilst specialised tribunals do not in theory constrain 
the remit of general institutions, ‘interjudicial dialogue’165 has in practice produced more nuanced 
outcomes. In Belilos,
166
 the ECtHR actively sought to distinguish ICJ jurisprudence on the 
opposability of reservations to human rights treaties. The same issue was at stake in Loizidou
167
 
where Strasbourg, having considered the ICJ’s inter-state remit,168 built on Belilos by asserting that 
‘a fundamental difference in the role and purpose of the respective tribunals ... provides a compelling 
basis for distinguishing Convention practice from that of the International Court’.169 Strasbourg 
thereby asserted its own jurisdiction countered possible ICJ censure. The ILC would ultimately 
accept that this strand of ECtHR jurisprudence constituted a manifestation of the lex specialis 
principle.
170
 The need for specialist tribunals to justify such divergent practice indicates the degree to 
which this principle is warping under the increasing intensity of fragmentation. Not all Strasbourg 
interactions with ICJ case law, however, attempt to finesse the latter court’s jurisprudence; the 
subject matter at issue can pull the relationship between tribunals in different directions. In 
Behrami,
171
 Strasbourg refused to accept human-rights challenges where the impugned action, by 
international forces maintaining order in Kosovo, was based upon the UN’s mission ‘to secure 
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international peace and security’.172 This approach prevented a conflict between the ECtHR and the 
ICJ regarding the oversight UN operations.
173
  
The CJEU’s Kadi174 jurisprudence on the necessity of due process in the context of the EU’s 
application of the UN’s counter-terrorism asset-freezing regime provides the most prominent 
example of the adaptation of lex specialis, with the position taken by a specialist regional tribunal 
feeding back into the development of the general part of international law: 
 
[T]he Courts of the European Union must … ensure the review … of the lawfulness of all 
Union acts in the light of the fundamental rights forming an integral part of the European 
Union legal order, including review of such measures as are designed to give effect to 
resolutions adopted by the Security Council under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United 
Nations.
175
  
 
This approach does not ‘claim complete autarky’ from general international law for EU law,176 but 
rather foregrounds the exceptionally important concerns which have necessitated the CJEU’s distinct 
approach for the attention of other judicial institutions. The Kadi decisions not only alter the 
relationship between EU Law and wider international law, the divide they exposed between these 
legal orders deepened autochthonous principles within EU law.
177
 The CJEU’s stand on due process 
rights provoked wider reform within UN-mandated asset-freezing, including the introduction of 
independent oversight.
178
 A broader debate on whether the ongoing court-centred 
constitutionalisation process can continue without a political process which enhances democratic 
legitimacy within global governance may be increasingly desirable, but such jurisprudence is capable 
of incrementally restructuring the global legal order into a constitutionalised system.  
 
(ii) The Four Facets in Practice: Opinion 2/13  
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A case which showcases these four facets of fragmented constitutionalisation is the CJEU’s refusal, 
in Opinion 2/13,
179
 to accept that the EU can accede to the ECHR on the terms of the Draft 
Agreement on Accession.
180
 This refusal does not sit easily with Court’s participation in the 
Agreement’s drafting,181 or with the fact that its refusal to countenance accession two decades earlier 
in Opinion 2/94
182
 was based upon a lack of EU competence to do so. Although it might be 
suggested that Opinion 2/13 is of regional significance but little wider importance for the global legal 
order, the CJEU and the ECtHR have been standard bearers for judicial constitutionalisation. Of the 
examples already discussed Kadi, Belilos and the Mox Plant cases demonstrate not only the 
importance of these courts, but also their propensity to be drawn into conflict with each other and 
other  tribunals. Although the Lisbon Treaty sought to address this issue by requiring the EU to 
accede to the ECHR,
183
 opponents of international constitutionalisation have delighted at the CJEU’s 
efforts to stymie the integration of these two legal orders. In the wake of Opinion 2/13 the UK’s then 
Lord Chancellor (and subsequently leading Brexit campaigner) Chris Grayling crowed that the CJEU 
was right to be concerned that the ECtHR has ‘a legal blank cheque to decide different things in 
different areas in the way that it chooses’.184 Opinion 2/13, however, is far from the end of this story 
of integration, and as we shall demonstrate the CJEU and ECtHR are continuing to forge their 
relationship through case law. As such, this particular clash between regional courts provides a 
concentrated version of the conflicts emergent within the global order and evidence of the 
transformational potential of such conflicts.  
The CJEU’s decision is unsurprising in light of fragmented constitutionalisation; in both 
Opinion 2/94 and Opinion 2/13 the CJEU was defending its own competences against the possibility 
of having to submit to the ECtHR’s jurisdiction. In fragmented and constitutionalising orders many 
judges will instinctively seek to preserve the jurisdiction of their own tribunal against perceived 
threats. This motivation is all the more powerful when a rival tribunal is regarded as successful. Both 
the ECHR and EU have been, in terms of regional tribunals, ‘exceptionally active’.185 In little over 
50 years of jurisprudence they have played a vital role in deepening the legal orders they 
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superintend.
186
 Both institutions have had to develop and manage their relationships with the 
domestic courts of their respective member states. In recent decades both have faced challenges as 
their success threatened to swamp their mechanisms and have undergone restructuring to enable 
them to address these challenges.
187
 Opinion 2/13 is therefore driven by the express concern that the 
ECtHR is a tribunal which could conceivably establish itself as superior to the CJEU within aspects 
of its area of competence
188
 and which might in some instances be able ‘to take the place of the 
Court of Justice’.189 
This position, at first sight, seems to overstate the threat posed by the ECtHR, which is 
ordinarily considered to have the remit of providing an authoritative interpretation of ECHR 
rights.
190
 But Strasbourg has also been prepared to clothe its function in constitutional garb in certain 
decisions, going so far as to proclaim the ECHR to be ‘a constitutional instrument of European 
public order’.191 The ECtHR has also extended its remit over explicitly EU measures in recent 
decades, in Matthews
192
 holding the UK responsible for breaches of voting rights of residents of 
Gibraltar denied the vote in the European Parliament elections, even though the UK was bound to 
take this course of action through the application of European Community law.
193
 Such rulings 
risked raising hackles, for the provisions in question were not amenable to CJEU review.
194
 The 
ECtHR did attempt to restrict the potential for conflict in Bosphorus Airways,
195
 noting that ‘the 
[EU’s] judicial organs are better placed to interpret and apply [EU] law’.196 In what Tomuschat 
describes as a ‘grown-up’ decision, Strasbourg recognised that as the EU organs had ‘handled human 
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rights issues responsibly, there was no need for an additional stage of international review’.197 It has 
since maintained that ‘it is primarily for the national authorities … to interpret and apply domestic 
law, if necessary in conformity with [EU] law, the Court’s role being confined to ascertaining 
whether the effects of such adjudication are compatible with the Convention’.198 Nonetheless, the 
ECtHR’s capacity to review the application of measures, even when they lie outside the CJEU’s 
competence, remained a concern in Opinion 2/13. The Luxembourg Court noted the limits to its 
jurisdiction to review activity pursuant to EU Common Foreign and Security Policy,
199
 and 
complained that the same strictures would not apply to the ECtHR.
200
 
In fragmented orders flashpoint cases shape the relationships between courts. The Accession 
Agreement, however, marked an effort to impose a relationship, as opposed to codifying a dynamic 
established by existing jurisprudence. As such, it was always likely to provoke a backlash in trying to 
yoke together two legal orders in advance of their respective flagship tribunals building a 
relationship on their own terms. The most pressing problem with the CJEU’s ruling is not its all-too-
predictable defensiveness, but the lengths to which this runs. Backed into a corner, the CJEU risks 
sealing off interaction with other regional and international systems out of concern for the 
“uniqueness” of the EU legal order:201  
 
The autonomy enjoyed by EU law in relation to the laws of the Member States and in relation 
to international law requires that the interpretation of those fundamental rights be ensured 
within the framework of the structure and objectives of the EU.
202
 
 
The irony in this approach is that the CJEU is in many ways behaving just as EU member state apex 
courts have long done in attempting to secure their position in the face of its claims of primacy.
203
 To 
this day the CJEU’s relationship with national courts remains uneasy, with Lords Neuberger and 
Mance asserting in the UK Supreme Court, with a certain prescience given the outcome of the UK’s 
Brexit referendum, that it is ‘certainly arguable (and it is for United Kingdom law and courts to 
determine) that there may be fundamental principles … of which Parliament when it enacted the 
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European Communities Act 1972 did not either contemplate or authorise the abrogation’.204 
Speculative fears that the national courts might exploit the post-accession relationship between the 
CJEU and ECtHR pervade Opinion 2/13. The CJEU’s concerns that Protocol 16 ECHR, by which 
apex courts in ECHR states can refer questions to Strasbourg for advisory rulings, might be used to 
usurp EU law’s preliminary reference procedure205 are explained at length, even though Protocol 16 
is yet to enter force, had not at the time been ratified by a single EU member state,
206
 and was a 
process not covered by the Accession Agreement.
207
 
Former ECtHR judge David Thór Björgvinsson has described Opinion 2/13 as ‘a political 
decision disguised in legal arguments’.208 ECtHR President Spielmann was also quick to convey 
Strasbourg’s ‘disappointment’, questioning Opinion 2/13’s rationale in light of the European 
project’s telos and its neglect for the intent of the state parties to the Lisbon Treaty:  
 
In deciding that the Union would accede to the European Convention on Human Rights, the 
drafters of the Lisbon Treaty clearly sought to complete the European legal area of human 
rights ... The opinion of the Court of Justice does not render that plan obsolete; it does not 
deprive it of its pertinence.
209
  
 
In a fragmented order, however, the pertinence of a rationalisation scheme is not necessarily 
sufficient to secure its adoption, because constitutional objectives such as a homogenous 
interpretation of human rights can be achieved in large part without such interventions. To date, ‘the 
story of human rights in the EU is largely the story of interaction between the Luxembourg and 
Strasbourg courts’.210 Forcing accession upon a reluctant CJEU would hardly have settled the issue; 
Luxembourg would continue to resist subordination to Strasbourg.  
Opinion 2/13 is not the final word on the EU/ECHR relationship but a milestone in competition 
between two courts. The ECtHR retains the ability to put indirect pressure on the CJEU, perhaps by 
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restricting the Bosphorus doctrine.
211
 Far from insulating the EU legal order from the reach of the 
ECtHR, Opinion 2/13 merely moves the focus of a challenge from the EU measure itself to 
implementation activity undertaken by the 28 EU member states, all parties to the ECHR. Potential 
flashpoints include EU member state implementation of the European Arrest Warrant or EU 
immigration rules, areas in which the CJEU has to date placed a premium upon ‘mutual trust’212 
between states to avoid being drawn into assessing varying standards of rights protection.
213
 By 
entertaining challenges in these areas, and likely drawing upon the TEU’s statement of the symbiotic 
relationship between the two orders, the ECtHR could bring the struggle to a crisis point, potentially 
obliging member states to intervene and impose a settlement. Such a standoff is, however, far from 
inevitable. The CJEU has in many cases been careful to respect the ECtHR’s purview, asserting that 
EU law ‘does not govern the relations between the ECHR and the legal systems of the Member 
States’.214 In a manner which is more low-key than the aggrandising sentiments of Opinion 2/13 
efforts are under way to map the CJEU’s approach to ECtHR jurisprudence.215 In Bero216 Advocate 
General Bot recognised that EU law on the expulsion of third-country nationals had been adopted to 
align with ECHR requirements
217
 and took account of the relevant ECtHR jurisprudence in his 
opinion.
218
 If Advocate Generals’ opinions have become an outlet for explaining the links between 
EU law and the ECHR, this avenue for rapprochement has been restricted by the CJEU’s refusal to 
engage with ECtHR decisions in its subsequent decisions.
219
 Nonetheless, the scope for 
‘spontaneous, mutual accommodation’ clearly exists.220  
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The Opinion 2/13 conflict might well be localised to two well-developed regional systems, but 
it could be the harbinger of increasingly intense skirmishes across the global legal order if parts of 
the order continue to deepen and constitutionalise. Domestic, regional, global and specialised bodies 
with distinct but often overlapping jurisdictions and stakeholders cannot indefinitely continue to 
function on the basis of fuzzy notions of comity. Fragmentation duplicates arrangements and can 
incidentally promote the mystification of processes and institutions, but it also generates the tensions 
necessary to overcome these problems. Intense institutional rivalries, comparable to those presently 
gripping the European legal orders, were eventually played out during the UK Constitution’s 
development. Judge-driven constitutional activity, including the CJEU’s role in developing EU 
Law,
221
 the DSB’s impact upon WTO processes,222 and the ICJ’s posturing as an apex court,223 
locates courts as vital nodes within global constitutionalisation with the capacity to address gaps left 
by political processes. Such action often occurs in fragmented manner and does not need to be 
initiated by a particular constitutional settlement. Courts fighting to maintain their jurisdictions can, 
if supplied with sufficient litigation, elucidate constitutional principles and even systematise inter-
tribunal relations. Opinion 2/13 will not be the last setback in this process, but the burden of 
advancing constitutionalisation does not fall solely upon international courts. President Spielmann 
identified the role of other institutions in helping the Europe’s courts beyond their present impasse; 
‘The Union’s accession to the Convention is above all a political project and it will be for the 
European Union and its member States ... to provide the response that is called for by the Court of 
Justice’s opinion’.224 Whilst a trajectory towards a hierarchical global legal order is by no means 
inevitable, the UK’s constitutional history demonstrates the potential for fragmentation within 
international law to be turned into constitutional outcomes within a maturing governance order. 
 
Constitutional Alchemy 
 
Since the nineteenth century international law’s time has always seemed tantalisingly close; ‘The 
increasingly popular mantra of evolution was invoked, often in a mixture of social and legal 
evolutionary ideas, to explain not merely the relative powerlessness of international law but also its 
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forthcoming deliverance’.225 With the debate as to whether international relations can be subject to 
law largely settled by the fact of increased legalisation, does it move the goalposts to switch from 
asking whether global governance can be legalised to whether it can be constitutionalised? It does 
not, if fragmented legalisation is bound up in a constitutionalisation process and ‘the increasing 
density of international law is … indicative of the growing importance of international legal 
regimes’.226 The global legal order’s current, fragmented, state evidences a legalised and 
differentiated governance order primed for constitutionalisation.  
From a state of fragmentation and the beginnings of legalisation, the UK’s governance order 
gradually constitutionalised. Fragmentation remains at work in the UK’s legal systems; in England 
and Wales activity as common as anti-social behaviour can potentially be addressed through criminal 
law responses, under quasi-criminal anti-social behaviour mechanisms or via a tort action in 
nuisance. The interaction between the courts administering such cases may have become 
systematised and hierarchical, but in the sweep of constitutional history these are relatively recent 
developments. Harold Berman once asserted that, in all legal systems, ‘great events themselves have 
exerted pressures for change in certain directions over a long period’.227 In the UK’s uncodified order 
not only great events, but even relatively unimportant ones, are often invested with constitutional 
significance; ‘[e]verything that happens is constitutional’.228 We enjoy sufficient historical 
perspective to chart how pressures for change within the UK’s governance order gradually advanced 
constitutionalisation even though the legal order remained ‘both polycentric and stable for 
centuries’.229 In the absence of such perspective regarding the global order, attempts to assess its 
supposed ‘constitutional moments’230 are, of necessity, contingent. Nonetheless, we maintain that the 
global legal order could also constitutionalise without a codified global constitution. Small and 
seemingly insignificant moments can ultimately forge a constitutional structure.  
If the global legal order is to fully constitutionalise, fragmentation must ultimately be either 
addressed or accommodated. Doing so will likely generate problems of a similar nature (but on an 
increased scale) to those experienced during the UK’s constitutionalisation process. The UK’s 
nineteenth-century Judicature Acts were necessary because its judicial architecture by that point 
lagged behind its other constitutional arrangements. The inertia which had slowed these reforms was 
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generated by vested interests’ concerns over who would be the winners and losers.231 That the UK’s 
fragmented judicial institutions could ultimately be reorganised to better serve the needs of a 
capitalist and proto-liberal-democratic society indicates that fragmentation is not an insurmountable 
obstacle to constitutionalisation. Comparable inertia currently hampers the integration of distinct 
legal orders at the global and regional levels, as exemplified in Opinion 2/13. The Draft Agreement 
on Accession in some respects mirrors the Judicature Acts, with the aim behind both measures being 
to restructure the relationship between courts to counter fragmentation. But such planned 
restructuring of the relationship between regional legal orders is not the only means of mitigating 
fragmentation when it becomes burdensome. In an uncodified global legal order inter-institutional 
accommodations might well have the same effect as formal reorganisations. Such accommodations, 
moreover, might have to become embedded before any codification of the relationship between 
courts is accepted. 
We leave for another occasion the second-order question of whether, assuming that further 
constitutionalisation of the current system of global governance is possible, it is ultimately desirable. 
Kennedy remains concerned by such developments; ‘[w]hat if the distances are so great, the forces 
so chaotic, the differences in situation so profound that the constitution ratifies what ought rather to 
be transformed?’232 Talk of ratification betrays a conception of “constitutionalisation” which we do 
not share. A constitutional order founded on the interrelationship between fundamental principles 
and interaction between institutions, and not reliant upon a codified instrument, may well embody 
the responsiveness necessary to meet changing global circumstances. For now it suffices to note that 
any uncodified constitutionalised global order would not replace domestic governance structures, but 
augment their role so as to better secure the idealised goals of peace and human rights. No 
constitutional order is static or immutable but uncodified arrangements can moderate some of the 
biases against reform experienced by codified systems. UK constitutional history offers an 
instructive prism through which to examine fragmentation’s contributions to constitutionalisation. 
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